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FEDERAL PRoCBDURB-MANnAMus-R:Evmw oF FEDERAL DISTRICT CouRT

28 U.S.C. §1406 ( a ) Petitioner instituted a treble damage suit alleging violation of the antitrust
laws in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida, naming
the insurance commissioner of Georgia, the insurance commissioner of Florida,
and four insurance companies residing and doing business in the Southern
District of Florida as defendants. The Georgia insurance commissioner, who
was personally served in the Northern District of Florida, entered a special
ORDER OF SEVERANCE .AND TRANSFER PURSUANT TO
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appearance to dismiss the action for improper venue. Petitioner contended
that the Georgia commissioner was "found or has an agent"1 in the Southern
District of Florida on the theory that co-conspirators are each other's agents,
and since other members of the · alleged conspiracy were in the Southern
District of Florida, venue in that district was proper as to all defendants.
Respondent judge held that as to the Georgia commissioner venue was improper
and ordered a severance and transfer of the action against him to the Northern
District of Georgia where said commissioner resided.2 A petition to the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to compel the district
court in Florida to vacate and set aside the order of severance and transfer
was dismissed as an inappropriate remedy.8 On certiorari the Supreme Court
held, affirmed. The writ was not necessary or appropriate in aid of the court's
jurisdiction and it was not clear that appeal provided an inadequate remedy.
Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Minton dissented on the ground that the
respondent judge appeared to be so clearly correct that certiorari should not
have been granted and therefore the case should have been dismissed without
opinion. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 74 S.Ct.
145 (1953).
.
The federal courts are empowered to issue writs of mandamus when
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,4 but will do
so only when the remedy of appeal is clearly inadequate.5 Judicial interpretation of the phrase "in aid of their respective jurisdictions" has been so
inconsistent that the cases would seem to be irreconcilable.6 It appears that
when a petitioner convinces a federal court that review by appeal is extremely
inadequate the writ will be granted and the requirement that it aid the court's
jurisdiction will be found to be satisfied.7 Although this requirement is often
1 15 U.S.C. (1946) §15: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has
an agent...."
2 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l406(a): "The district court of a district in which
is fileq. a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the
interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought."
8 In re Bankers Life & Casualty Co., (5th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 593.
4 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l651(a): ''The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
5 Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 1558 (1947).
6 50 CoL. L. REv. 537 (1950); 31 MicH. L. REv. 996 (1933); 33 CoL. L. REv. 366
(1933); 34 CoL. L. REv. 899 (1934); BLUME AND JOINER, CASES ON JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS 201 (1952).
7 In GO-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes, (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 410, affd.
344 U.S. 861, 73 S.Ct. 102 (1952), a petition for mandamus was granted ordering a
federal district court to exercise its discretion by either dismissing the case or transferring
it to another district or division. The court said that the question of its power to issue
mandamus need not be discussed because it was not contested by the respondent. A writ
of mandamus was issued in Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, (3d Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d)
111, cert. den. 340 U.S. 953, 71 S.Ct. 572 (1951), ordering the federal district court in
Delaware to transfer certain actions to a district court in Texas. Wiren v. Laws, (D.C. Cir.
1951) 194 F. (2d) 873, indicated that the court had power to issue a writ to prevent a
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relied on to deny a petition for an extraordinary writ,8 the central issue before
a court when considering a petition for mandamus is thus apparently the
adequacy of review by appeal. Where appellate review is totally unavailable
it is clearly an inadequate remedy. 9 The difficult cases are those in which
the ruling alleged to be erroneous causes practical problems and inconvenience
in trying a particular cause or in which the challenged ruling will not be
corrected by appeal because of practical considerations. The separate trial of
complex antitrust issues caused by the order of severance and transfer in the
principal case would seem to be a sufficient inconvenience to both the courts
and the petitioner to provide grounds for interlocutory review by extraordinary
writ. In addition, if the petitioner wins on the merits he probably will be unable
to collect his additional costs,10 and if he loses on the merits it will be extremely
difficult to show that the order of severance and transfer was a reversible error.11
Thus the petition for mandamus was dismissed in the present case despite the
fact the appellate process appears to be a most inadequate method of review.
In Magnetic Engineering Co. 11. Dings Co.12 it was stated that mandamus
might have been available if the order being challenged were clearly erroneous
even though it would eventually be reviewable by appeal.18 The dissent in
the Magnetic Engineering case pointed to this language as an indication that
the decision denying the writ might have been otherwise if the impropriety
of the order in question were "sufficiently glaring."14 In the principal case
the petitioner's conspiracy theory of agency for venue purposes was described
by the majority opinion as having "all the earmarks of a frivolous albeit
ingenious attempt to expand the statute."15 The dissent hinges its argument
that certiorari was improper on the apparent soundness of the ruling by the
respondent judge. Thus it would seem that mandamus may still be available
as a means of reviewing an order of severance and transfer pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1406(a) in a situation where review by appeal is clearly inadequate
and the order is based on a plainly erroneous ruling that venue is improper.

Judson M. Werbelow, S.Ed.
transfer of venue because of forum non conveniens but held that the particular circumstances did not warrant issuance of the writ. In Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, (2d Cir. 1950)
182 F. (2d) 329, it was held that mandamus would lie to review an interlocutory order
of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York refusing to transfer
the cause to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. However, the
writ was refused on the ground that the petitioner had not made out a strong enough case
for transfer. Cf. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944 (1949).
8 Gulf Research and Development Co. v. Leahy, (3d Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 302,
affd. 344 U.S. 861, 73 S.Ct. 102 (1952); Magnetic Engineering Co. v. Dings Co., (2d
Cir. 1950) 178 F. (2d) 866; Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 63 S.Ct.
938 (1943).
9 Gulf Research and Development Co. v. Harrison, (9th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 457.
10 Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, note 7 supra.
11 Magnetic Engineering Co. v. Dings Co., note 8 supra.

12Ibid.

1s Id. at 870.
14 Id. at 871.
15 Principal case at 384.

